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PERSPECTIVES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LATE NIGHT LIQUOR 
TRADING LOCKOUT LEGISLATIVE PROVISION 
Gavan Palk1, Jeremy Davey2, James Freeman3 & Hannah Morgan4 
Abstract 
The effectiveness of ‘the lockout policy’ integrated within a broader police 
enforcement strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm, in and around late-night licensed 
premises, in major drinking precincts was examined. First response operational police 
(n= 280) recorded all alcohol and non alcohol-related incidents they attended in and 
around late-night liquor trading premises. A before and after study design was used, 
with police completing modified activity logs prior to and following the introduction 
of the lockout policy in two policing regions: Gold Coast (n = 12,801 incidents); 
Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley (n = 9,117 incidents). Qualitative information from 
key stakeholders (e.g., Police, Security Staff & Politicians n = 20) was also obtained.  
The number of alcohol-related offences requiring police attention was significantly 
reduced in some policing areas and for some types of offences (e.g., sex offences, 
street disturbances, traffic incidents. However, there was no variation for a number of 
other offence categories (e.g., assault).  Interviews with licensees revealed that 
although all were initially opposed to the lockout policy, most perceived benefits from 
its introduction. This study was the first of its kind to comprehensively examine the 
impact of a lockout policy and provides supportive evidence for the effectiveness of 
the lockout policy as integrating positively with police enforcement to enhance public 
safety in some areas in and around late-night liquor trading premises.  
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Internationally, alcohol-related violence and drunken disorder is a major burden to the 
community and has a substantial impact on police resources (Cookson, 1992; Davey 
& French, 1995; Dingle, 2006; Greenfeld, 1998; Pernanen, Cousineau, Brochu & Sun, 
2002; Richardson & Budd, 2003). Currently the majority of drinking occurs in bars 
and clubs whereby patrons leave venues intoxicated, leading to cases of violence on 
the streets of high density drinking venues (Doherty & Roche, 2003). Recent research 
in Queensland (Australia) involving a large scale study encompassing urban, regional 
and rural areas indicates that a substantial proportion of current police work (i.e., 
25%) involves attendance at alcohol-related incidents (Palk, Davey & Freeman, 
2007a, 2007b).  
Currently police enforce alcohol-related crime using the following key 
mechanisms: enforcing the liquor licensing laws and responding to drunk, disorderly 
and offensive behaviour and taking action to reduce the risk (Doherty & Roche, 
2003). However, these police enforcement strategies are limited due to the difficulties 
in: obtaining successful prosecutions, operationalising police enforcement activities, 
licensing laws, and due to a dilution of officer knowledge and skills in the area 
(Doherty & Roche, 2003). It is therefore suggested by policing research (Doherty & 
Roche) that the approach of the police should embrace an intelligence-based role 
operating in a collaborative relationship with liquor licensing and licensing venues to 
achieve the shared goal of reducing alcohol-related harm. 
Alcohol-related Harms 
Not surprisingly, Australians are becoming increasingly concerned about problems 
associated with alcohol misuse in the community.  Studies in Australia, suggest that 
alcohol is a major contributor to events within the community that require police 
attendance (Arro, Crook, G., & Fenton, 1992; Davey & French, 1995; Ireland & 
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Thommeny, 1993). A significant proportion of risky/harmful drinking occurs in and 
around Australian licensed premises (pubs, nightclubs & hotels) (Lang Stockwell, 
Rydon, & Gamble 1992). In major cities such as Brisbane and the Gold Coast, large 
numbers of licensed venues operate within a small section of the city precinct, causing 
patron hordes in these areas, particularly on Friday and Saturday nights until the early 
morning (Block & Block, 1995; Jochelson, 1997).   
The associated crime with alcohol use is most likely to involve young males 
who engage in occasional excessive drinking as well as acts of violence and public 
disorder (Briscoe & Donnelly, 2001a; Homel, Thomsen, & Thommeny, 1997; Homel, 
Thomsen, Thommeny, 1991; Jochelson, 1997; Stockwell, 1997; Stockwell, Masters, 
Phillips, Daly, Gahegan, Midford, & Philp, 1998). In addition, it has been found that 
approximately 50% of non criminal traffic offences and other types of criminal 
offences were committed by individuals aged between 10 and 24 years. Moreover, the 
vast majority of assaults and public disorder are associated with a minority of licensed 
premises that have extended trading hours (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001b; Briscoe & 
Donnelly, 2003; Considine, Walker, Wiggers, Daly, Hazel, & Fairhill; Chikrizhs, 
Stockwell, & Masters, 1997). 
The fact that a substantive proportion of alcohol-related crime is associated 
with routine alcohol consumption activities of young males tends to lend credence to 
place based theories of crime (e.g., routine activities theory, rational choice theory & 
crime pattern theory). Place based theories of crime (see Cohen & Felson, 1979; 
Cornish & Clark, 1986; Eck & Weisburd, 1995) emphasise the importance of place, 
time and rational choice (though unsophisticated) in the context of physical and social 
factors that may encourage violence and disorder. Crime pattern theory (see Eck & 
Weisburd, 1995) in particular, suggests that crime is most likely to occur at specific 
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times and places during the routine activities of motivated offenders who make 
rational choices about the risks and benefits of their actions. When the risk of being 
caught is reduced by the absence of capable guardians such as intimate handlers (e.g., 
spouse or influential friend) and controllers or place managers (e.g., security officers 
& police) to regulate behaviour, crime and disorder are more prevalent. Computer 
mapping and geo-referencing of crime along with other temporal and spatial crime 
research demonstrates that crime is not a random event but occurs in concentrated 
places at certain times referred to as “Hot Spots” especially where alcohol is 
available. (Block & Block, 1995; Jochelson, 1997: Palk & Davey, 2005; Teece & 
Williams, 2000).  
Hence, place based theories of crimes suggest that crime and disorder can be 
reduced by manipulating key environmental factors that are viewed as providing 
opportunities and inducements to engage in socially deviant behaviour. Place based 
theories of crime are closely associated with the development of situational crime 
prevention theory (Clark, 1997, 1995, 1983, 1980) that advocates implementing 
environmental strategies to reduce the attractiveness and rewards associated with 
crime thereby reducing the opportunities to commit crime.        
 Safer Drinking Practices 
Various regulatory interventions founded on the principles of place based and 
situational crime prevention theories of crime have been established in Australian 
communities to reduce alcohol-related harm which have experienced varying levels of 
success. The underlying behavioural change theory of regulatory interventions is 
structural change caused by environmental constraints (reducing attractiveness & 
rewards associated with alcohol misuse) rather than a conscious decision to change. 
Regulatory interventions are aimed at reducing community wide unsafe drinking 
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practices by establishing control over: licensed venue regulations, hours of sale, the 
quantity permitted and price of alcohol (Babor, Caetano, Casswell, et al., 2003, 2010).  
Regulatory interventions implemented in Australia include: the restriction of 
alcohol availability by increasing the price to purchase alcohol through taxation. This 
was found to lead to a 54% reduction in sales of ready-to-drink alcohol beverages 
(RTD’s) from April to June 2008 (Chikritzhs, Dietze. Allsop, Daube, Hall, & Kypri, 
2009). It has been noted that youth are more sensitive to price changes than the rest of 
the population. In addition, restricting the settings of legal alcohol use has been found 
to be an effective strategy in reducing alcohol-related harm (Toumbourou, 2007). 
These interventions have had limited evaluation, however show promising effects at 
least in the short-term sustainability of safer drinking practices.  
The effectiveness of a community-based intervention is more likely to be 
enhanced when working within the existing community infrastructure (Wortel, de 
Vries, & de Geus, 1995). Community action safety projects working within the 
community infrastructure (Hauritz, Homel, McIlwain, Burrows, & Townsley, 1998; 
Homel et al., 1997; Wickes, Mazerolle & Risely, 2005) have been found to enhance 
safer drinking practices. In addition, proactive enforcement of liquor licensing laws 
through the coordination of a number of government agencies has been prominent in 
the Gold Coast area for a number of years (Liquor Enforcement and Proactive 
Strategies (LEAPS) (Roche & Inglis, 1999).  
Lockout Legislation 
Restricting the availability through hours and days of sale and reducing the number 
and types of licensing venues has been found to reduce alcohol-related problems 
(Barbor et al., 2003, 2010). A crime prevention strategy recently introduced in 
Australia is the lockout legislation strategy. This strategy was specifically 
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implemented in response to public concern about alcohol-related violence and 
disorder associated with patrons moving between licensed premises in the early 
morning of Friday and Saturday nights. Effectively the lockout policy prevents 
patrons from entering late-night liquor trading establishments between the hours of 
3am and 5am. However, patrons who are inside the licensed premise may remain 
inside and continue to consume alcohol until the time of closing at 5am.  
The lockout policy as a crime prevention strategy appears to have been utilised 
only within Australia and has not been evaluated extensively to date. One impact 
study investigating its effectiveness relates to the imposition of a 3am lockout on all 
late-night entertainment venues in the Central Business District (CBD) of the City of 
Ballarat, Victoria, Australia (Operation Link: Be Safe Late Program (OLBSL), 2004). 
Significant reductions related to assaults in licensed premises (47.5%) and public 
places (33.3%) were achieved following the introduction of the lockout.  
It is suggested that the lockout policy will reduce harmful drinking behaviours 
leading to alcohol-related crimes via a mechanism of structural change imposed by 
the environmental constraint the legislation poses, with restricted hours of drinking, 
rather than a conscious decision to change.  However, this may therefore lead to 
patron tension, as the change is forced upon them rather than patrons actively 
choosing their drinking behaviour. It is thought that due to the inconvenience of 
resuming drinking behaviours in private residence combined with reduced public 
transport at 3am will deter any temporal displacement of drinking at alternative 
venues.  
Aim of Study 
The aim of the current study is to build upon previous preliminary research (Palk, 
Davey & Freeman, 2010) reporting that a lockout legislative strategy introduced on 
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the Gold Coast Queensland Australia may reduce specific types of alcohol-related 
offences. In the current study, the Gold Coast lockout policy results are more 
extensively examined and compared to other late-night entertainment areas (Brisbane 
City & Fortitude Valley) in which the lockout policy was introduced at a later date. A 
before and after design was employed to examine the changes in alcohol-related 
offences, in particular, the number of alcohol-related incidents across all major 
offence categories.  
In addition to this quantitative analysis of the outcomes of the lockout policy, 
the experiences of licensees and other key stakeholders (Police, Security Staff & 
Politicians) involved with or affected by the implementation of the lockout policy 
were sought through interviews.  
Method 
Outcome Study (quantitative analysis)  
Participants, Materials and Procedure 
The participants in the current study were first response operational police officers 
(general duties police officers) from the Gold Coast Police District (n = 180), 
Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley (Valley) (n = 500). These areas were chosen for 
the study specifically due to their association with the late-night entertainment 
industry and the fact that the lockout policy had been initially trialled in these police 
precincts. Over the study period, general duties police officers completing their usual 
activity logs were also required to identify the type, time spent on, and the number of 
incidents attended at which persons involved were affected by alcohol or other drugs. 
Determination of whether an incident should be recorded as alcohol-related or not was 
made by the individual Officers involved based on their professional experience and 
training provided to participate in the current study (see below). The associated 
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limitations of this process are highlighted in the discussion section. Police officers 
also recorded demographic factors including, the age and gender of persons as well as 
the time and location of offences and incidents. 
The lockout policy was introduced on the Gold Coast on the 29 March 2004. 
The study commenced 4 weeks prior to this (before phase) and continued for 5 weeks 
after the introduction of the lockout (pre-post test design). The lockout strategy was 
subsequently introduced in Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley Police precincts on the 
1st April 2005 and data collection in this area was conducted over an 8 week period (4 
weeks prior and 4 weeks after the introduction of the lockout.  Appropriate statistics 
were conducted to account for the differing post test data values for the Gold Coast 
and Brisbane area.  Due to the slightly different pre and post time periods for the Gold 
Coast data, statistics were analysed proportionally to account for these differences.  
Police officers received training in how to complete the modified activity logs 
and were provided with written instructions on how to accurately record incidents 
involved with alcohol and other illicit substances. In addition, a co-ordinator was 
available throughout the study period to provide guidance to general duties police 
requiring assistance to identify the category of offence and whether or not the incident 
should be considered alcohol-related. Several research assistants were also employed 
to code and input the data into the Mircosoft Excel and to examine the modified 
activity logs to ensure that the category of offences were correctly recorded and that 
incidents were correctly identified as involving alcohol or an illicit substance. 
Data Analysis 
Details of the time of the offence, offence type, place of incident, persons involved, 
and importantly, whether alcohol was involved in the incident were transferred from 
the modified police activity logs into a computer database for analysis using the 
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Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 14.0 (SPSS V 14.0). Unless 
otherwise stated, tests were conducted using a significance level of α = .05 
In order to examine when the offences were committed, time of offence was 
categorised into three main time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am, 6am-9am) of three 
hours duration. This allowed for a comparison between proportions of offences 
committed immediately prior to, during and following the lockout times of the early 
morning. The three hour time period was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, it 
provided an opportunity to ensure there would be a sufficient number of alcohol-
related incidents to provide statistical power for analysis. Secondly, although the 
doors to the venues were only locked for two hours (3am-5am), the authors were 
interested in examining whether the lockout policy could prevent or increase the level 
of public disorder and violence in the proceeding hour after the lockout was over and 
licensed premises were closed. This time period is crucial as it is the time when 
patrons exit licensed premises and make their way home by a variety of means, 
including public transport that may require waiting for periods in taxi ranks.  Finally, 
it was thought important to look for differences in the incidence of offences amongst 
the three key time periods in order to investigate whether there was any displacement 
of alcohol-related incidents or diffusion benefits into surroundings times as a result of 
the lockout policy.  However, complementary analyses were undertaken (where 
appropriate) for offences that occurred between 3-5am as compared to 3-6am.   
The Interview Study: Design and Methodology 
Participants, Materials and Procedure  
This part of the study utilised purposive sampling techniques (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994; Guba & Lincoln; 1989) to enable the identification of key participants from 
within the lockout operational geographical locations. These key people were closely 
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associated with critical aspects of either the implementation of the lockout policy or 
its enforcement and were therefore able to provide rich comment on the processes 
involved from a perspective internal to the intervention. The perspectives of those 
directly affected by the policy (that is owners/operators of licensed premises affected 
by the lockout policy) were also interviewed. The final sample of those interviewed 
included state and local political representatives from within the lockout study areas 
(n = 5) police and liquor licensing managers who were involved in developing, 
implementing and enforcing the lockout legislative provisions (n = 5) and 
owners/operators (n = 10) of licensed premises that had extended liquor trading 
permits to 5am. 
 Face-face interviews of 1-2 hour’s duration were conducted by the first author 
with all except one participant, who preferred to respond in detail in writing rather 
than being interviewed. Participants were provided with an interview schedule prior to 
the time of the interview.  This schedule consisted of a set of open ended questions 
about perceptions of the benefits, pitfalls and effectiveness of the lockout policy, 
possible factors that might impede or facilitate its operational success, and the 
socio/political context surrounding its introduction. Participants’ ideas about measures 
that could be used to improve the lockout policy were also sought.  During the 
interviews, the interviewer used probing questions to clarify responses where 
necessary and to seek further information about participants’ experience with the 
lockout policy.  
Due to the sensitive nature of the lockout policy and because some participants 
had expressed concern about being identified, interviews were not taped.  Instead, 
notes of participants’ responses were taken by the interviewer during the interview. 
Before finishing the interview, the interviewer checked the accuracy of the notes with 
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the participant. This allowed participants the opportunity to correct any 
misunderstandings or to clarify points.  These notes were then given a code in order to 
further protect the anonymity of participants. Following the interviews, the first 
author rewrote and then typed the responses of the participants. In some instances, 
further clarification of responses were sought from participants to ensure the first 
author had accurately recorded the participants’ responses.  
Analysis 
The information gathered from the participants was based partly on the principles of 
grounded theory that entails categorising participants’ responses into major coded 
themes without preconceived ideas (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The participants’ 
responses were reread by the first author a number of times utilising a qualitative 
content analytic approach that was both comparative and constant (Strauss, 1987; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1997). This enabled the first author to discover and portray the 
recurring major themes.  
Thematic analysis (van Mansen, 1990) was used to identify major and minor 
themes within the interview notes.  In order to ensure accuracy in this identification, 
an independent researcher also conducted a thematic analysis and findings were 
compared with those of the interviewer (eg., inter-rater reliability). The themes were 
finally compared within and across interviews in order to increase the reliability of the 
interpretations. The coded themes were devised to reflect the study’s pre-determined 
open ended questions. Additional codes were also constructed to represent other 
relevant information obtained during the interview process.  
 Comparison of both Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
As mentioned, the Lockout legislative provision was introduced in the major 
night time entertainment precincts of Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley 
 13
approximately one year after its introduction in the Gold Coast Police District. Due to 
the time difference it was therefore considered inappropriate to merge the data 
obtained for the Gold Coast in 2004 and Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley obtained in 
2005 for a direct analytical comparison. Separate statistical analyses were undertaken 
for the three late-night entertainment areas and caution should be excised in directly 
comparing the Gold Coast data and the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley data. As the 
Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley data were collected during the same time frame 
(April/May 2004), direct comparisons are possible. Most of quantitative data for the 
three late-night entertainment areas are depicted in the same tables for ease of 
presentation and space limitations.  
However, as this study was also interested in gathering qualitative information 
about the implementation process of the lockout policy, it is worth comparing the 
data from the Gold Coast area with data for the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley and 
exploring both qualitative and quantitative trends. 
Results 
Characteristics of Sample 
During the study period a total of 12,801 and 9,117 incidents that required police 
attendance were recorded as individual log entries by participating police officers (n-
280) in the Gold Coast Police District and the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley Police 
precincts, respectively.  At the time of the study, there were approximately 757 
venues licensed to sell liquor on the Gold Coast. The majority of these alcohol outlets 
were located in Surfers Paradise (268, 35.4%) and Broadbeach (134, 17.7%) and 
closed between the hours of 10pm and 3am. Surfers Paradise and Broadbeach were 
the only locations in which hotels or nightclubs traded until 5am.  Only 25(3.3%) 
licensed premises in the Gold Coast area at the time of the study had extended trading 
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permits allowing them to remain open until 5am.  Additionally, most of these licensed 
premises (23) are located in a small geographical area at Surfers Paradise.  
In the Brisbane area, there are two main precincts, which are approximately 
three kilometres from each other, Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley, in which late-
night entertainment is popular. At the time of the study and in the location of the 
study there were approximately 247 venues in Brisbane City licensed to sell liquor. 
The majority of them (230, 86.5%) closed between 10pm and 3am. Only a small 
number of licensed premises were permitted to trade until 5am (17, 14.5%). In the 
area of Fortitude Valley in which the study was conducted, there were approximately 
146 venues licensed to sell liquor. Of these, 31 (21%) were permitted to trade until 
5am.  
Although the majority of late-night liquor trading premises in the Gold Coast 
and Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley areas were approached for the purposes of the 
study, only 10 (13.7%) of a total 73 late-night trading licensed premises agreed to 
participate in the study.  
 Quantitative Analysis 
Table 1 depicts the number of incidents requiring police attendance in and around 
licensed premises before and after the lockout legislative provision was introduced. 
The Chi-square test revealed that there is a significant difference in the number of 
alcohol-related incidents before and after the introduction of lockout for all time 
periods (across 24 hours) in the Gold Coast Police District, even after considering a 
Bonferroni correction [ ,0001.0,98.15)799,12,1(2  pN odds ratio = 1.2] (Table 
1). In respect to alcohol-related incidents in the Gold Coast area during the 3am-6am 
time period before and after the lockout was introduced, the Chi-square test showed 
there were significantly fewer alcohol-related incidents between 3am-6am after the 
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lockout was introduced  [ ,9.11)842,1(2 N  p = 0.0005, odds ratio = 1.7] (Table 
1).  A similar analysis utilising the 3-5am timeframe (as compared to 3-6am) was also 
implemented which produced similar results. 
While the data for the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley was collected 12 months 
after the Gold Coast data, the same hourly time periods before and after the 
introduction of the lockout were used. No significant differences were found for 
alcohol-related incidents across all the time periods following the introduction of the 
lockout in the Brisbane City [ ,66.0,19.0)5156,1(2  pN odds ratio = 1.0] and 
Fortitude Valley )3368,1(2 N  = 1.50, p = 0.22, odds ratio = 1.1] Police Precincts 
(Table 1). In addition, there were no significant differences for alcohol-related 
incidents between the 3am-6am time period after the introduction of the lockout 
legislative provision in the Brisbane City  [  )780,1(2 N  ,82.0,051.0 p odds 
ratio = 1.1] or the Fortitude Valley  [ ,64.0)322,1(2 N  p = 0.42                                                        
odds ratio = 1.2] (Table 1).           
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The second quantitative examination focussed on investigating the impact of 
the lockout legislative provision on the prevalence of the major category of offences 
more likely to occur during late-night liquor trading across a 24 hour period. Table 2 
highlights the specific number and percentages of alcohol-related incidents for each 
of the major category of offences across all time periods (i.e., 24 hours). Due to space 
limitations, only Chi-squares and odd ratios for events that were significant are 
reported. As shown in Table 2, there were significantly fewer street/disturbances 
(12.3%) [ ,02.0,39.5)321,1(2  pN odds ratio = 1.75] and sexual offences 
(33.7%) [ )80,1(2 N = 8.49, p = 0.004, odds ratio = 4.4] after the introduction of 
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the lockout policy in the Gold Coast Police District. While downward trends were 
observed in the other three major categories of offences (Traffic, Assaults & Personal 
Trauma) in the Gold Coast area, no significant differences were recorded (see Table 
2). Additionally, while alcohol-related disturbances/disputes were reduced by 6.2%, 
this difference is not considered significant after making a Bonferroni correction to 
accommodate for implementing multiple chi-square analyses  [ )1030,1(2 N = 
3.38, p = 0.05, odds ratio = 1.3]. 
An examination of the major categories of offences involving alcohol before 
and after the lockout in the Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley Police precincts 
revealed little variation (Table 2).  Some categories experienced an upward trend 
while others experienced a downward trend. However, the only major offence 
category to experience a significant change following the introduction of the lockout 
policy involved personal trauma.  There were 30% less alcohol-related trauma 
offences in the Fortitude Valley after the lockout was introduced [ )129,1(2 N = 
13.7, p = 0.000, odds ratio = 0.19. 
INSERT TABE 2 HERE 
The third quantitative examination concentrated on examining the impact of 
the lockout legislative provision on the prevalence of the major category of offences 
more likely to occur during late-night liquor trading during the three key three hour 
time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am  & 6am-9am). Tables 3 and 4 highlight the 
specific number and percentages of alcohol-related incidents for each of the major 
category of offences occurring during the three hourly time periods as well as for 
offences occurring in all other times periods.  
Only Chi-squares and odd ratios for significant results are depicted due to 
space limitations and Bonferroni corrections were implemented to accommodate 
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multiple chi-square analyses. As shown in Table 3, that depicts the percentages of 
alcohol-related offences for the key three hour time periods on the Gold Coast before 
and after the introduction of the lockout, significant differences were found for only a 
few of the offence categories. The Chi-square test revealed the disturbance/disputes 
involving alcohol were 19.2% less likely to occur after the introduction of the lockout 
[ 175,1(2 N = 5.72, p = 0.01, odds ratio = 2.43] during the 12am-3am time period. 
Street disturbances were also less likely (17.9%) to occur after the introduction of the 
lockout [ )138,1(2 N = 4.37, p = 0.02, odds ratio = 2.07] during all the other time 
periods.   Sexual offences were also less likely (29.2%) to occur after the introduction 
of the lockout [ )54,1(2 N = 4.33, p = 0.03, odds ratio 4.29] during all the other 
time periods.  Traffic offences were more likely (4.5%) to occur after the introduction 
of the lockout )1835,1(2 N = 3.37, p = 0.03, odds ratio 0.82] during all other time 
periods. It is noted that while there were some significant variations for non lockout 
time periods, no significant variations were recorded during the lockout time period.  
A similar series of analyses were undertaken for offences that occurred between 3-
5am (as compared to 3-6am) which produced similar results, as significant reductions 
were again found among disturbances/disputes, street disturbances and sexual 
offences.   
 INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 4 shows the percentage of alcohol-related offences for the three main 
time   periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am & 6am-9am) and for all other time periods for 
the police precincts in Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley (Valley). There were only a 
few significant variations noted for some of the major categories of alcohol-related 
offences, after making Bonferroni correction adjustments. The only significant 
variation to occur in the Brisbane City area involved traffic offences during the 3am-
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6am time period. There were significantly fewer traffic offences (12.9%) following 
the introduction of the lockout )157,1(2 N = 4.19, p = 0.03, odds ratio 0.41].  
There were a number of significant variations in the Fortitude Valley area. 
Street disturbances were significantly reduced by 16% [ )130,1(2 N = 3.20, p = 
0.05, odds ratio 0.52] and personal trauma offences were also significantly decreased 
by 14.6% [ )85,1(2 N = 4.32, p = 0.03, odds ratio 0.33] during all other time 
periods. In respect to alcohol-related disturbances/disputes, these types of offences 
were significantly decreased (29.0%) [ )57,1(2 N = 4.31, p = 0.03, odds ratio 0.30] 
during the 12am-3am time period but there was a significant increase (33.8%) during 
the 3am-6am time period )48,1(2 N = 5.58, p = 0.02, odds ratio 4.32].  Similar to 
above, a series of analyses were undertaken for offences that occurred between 3-5am 
(as compared to 3-6am) which identified the same significant outcomes e.g., 
reductions in personal trauma and alcohol-related disturbances.     
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 The final quantitative examination analysed the proportional differences 
between the key time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am & 6am-9am) to assess for 
possible displacement and diffusion benefit effects of the major alcohol-related 
offence categories. There was no evidence that the lockout policy resulted in a 
displacement or reduction (diffusion benefits) of alcohol-related offences to non 
lockout time periods, particularly those time periods prior to and following the 
lockout period. In addition, a review of offence trends reported by the QPS 
(Queensland Police Service, 2004) revealed no corresponding overall decreases in 
offending rates during the current study period. Similarly, the most recent analysis of 
trends in alcohol-related violence in Australia indicates the prevalence rates have 
remained relatively stable over a decade (Matthews, Chikritzhs, Stockwell, & Donath, 
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2002).  In contrast, there was virtually no recorded change for traffic offences (a slight 
increase of 0.8%). Furthermore, while reductions were evident for offences against 
the person (10.8%), property (0.8%) and stealing (1.7%), these levels did not reach 
statistical significance.  
Qualitative Analysis 
A number of key themes emerged in response to the semi-structured interviews with 
the stakeholders affected by (or involved with) the lockout policy. These themes were 
grouped under the following headings: Advantages and Disadvantages of Lockout 
Policy; Transport Concerns; Public Safety and Security Issues; and Implementation 
Process Issues.  A number of issues under these key themes were raised by the sample 
and participants’ quotes are identified by the letter p and a number to preserve 
anonymity. The letters gg appearing after the letter and number indicates the 
participant was from the Gold Coast. All other participants were from the Brisbane 
and Fortitude Valley areas.  
Advantages of Lockout Policy  
 In regards to managing intoxicated persons, a major theme was that licensees 
indicated that door staff and crowd controllers felt that the lockout policy provided a 
means to exclude the most troublesome patrons: “Door staff, crowd controllers love 
the lockout gives patrons them an excuse to keep the really intoxicated out” (p15, p12, 
p17, p18). “No reduction inside (p18)”. “Most patrons out at this hour are the 
troublesome ones” (p1). Most trying to get in that hour are usually unwelcome” (p10). 
Views about street behaviour and violence were evenly mixed with some 
participants believing that there were fewer problems related to transport, crowding 
and violence on the street while others believed the lockout policy had no affect on 
these issues. Most licensees denied there are any major problems related to violence 
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in their premises and importantly, indicated that violence was more likely to occur on 
the streets around licensed premises: “Quieter less violence on the street” (p7, p9, 
p12). Less transport problems” (p7). “Reduced patron traffic outside & around venue 
after 3am. Trouble is  on the streets not in the clubs” (p14). Not much difference for 
violence does  clear up before 6am, patrons not hanging around” (p15). “ No 
reduction” (p19). 
In relation to the impact of the lockout policy on business revenue, a theme to 
emerge was that most licensees indicated that patron numbers and income remained 
largely unaffected by the lockout policy. The majority of licensees stated that they 
were initially opposed to the introduction of the lockout because they felt it would 
have a negative impact on income revenue. However, once the lockout was 
introduced, licensees implemented novel marketing practices and changes in business 
practices to retain patrons within the licensed premise during the lockout time period. 
In fact the licensees believed that these strategies coupled with the lockout policy in 
fact improved patron numbers and income revenue: “In most ways it has benefited 
our business. Mainly it has helped us to hold our patrons later into the night and 
increased revenue” (p19). Profit not greatly affected” (p10, p11). “Now doing better 
due to management strategies. Before lockout patrons leave between 2am & 3am but 
now locking them in between 3-5am” (p14). Business increase due to marketing 
strategies” (p14). “Business gone up due to smoking laws. Initially opposed to it 
(lockout) but now good for business, less people to go to the Valley” (p18).  
Disadvantages of Lockout Policy 
When the lockout was first introduced, some door staff reported that they encountered 
an increase in aggression towards them when patrons were refused entry: “Initially 
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when lockout started door staff encountered increased violence towards them when 
entry refused” (p7). 
A theme also emerged regarding concern being expressed about the long waiting lines 
on footpaths created by patrons while they were trying to enter licensed premises and 
the potential for these patrons to be struck by motor vehicles. There was some 
perception that violence on the street was still at similar levels prior to the lockout. 
However, police reported that it was much quieter and almost like a ghost town 
during the lockout policy time period. At least one licensee believed that the lockout 
had created behavioural problems for two time periods (3am & 5am) in relation to 
patrons trying to gain access to licensed premises or trying to obtain a taxi. 
Previously, Licensees indicated that there was only one time period (5am) in which 
most behavioural problems occurred:“Less problems inside (p12gg) “...but has 
created more problems outside according to security companies” (p8). “No decrease 
in violence on streets, just come around here at 3am and you can see the violence” 
(p13gg). More violence on the street, big events line up six deep, danger from cars 
and trucks” (p15). “No less violence on the streets (16), problems initially at 5am, 
now at 3am and 5am, can’t get into clubs, take problems out on taxi drivers” (p17). 
Clubs being made responsible for street violence, to a point this is okay (p19). 
Another theme to emerge was that some licensees also felt that both interstate 
and international visitors were confused about the lockout as they had not experienced 
this sort of initiative in their local area: “Not aware of lockout & have difficulty 
understanding it” (p7, p13). There was also a belief among licensees that the lockout 
had caused some anxiety among patrons as to which licensed premise they would 
prefer to be in just before the lockout commenced. In addition, patrons who chose 
licensed premises without designated smoking areas could not leave the premises for 
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a smoke during the lockout due to a no smoking policy in licensed premises that had 
been recently introduced by the State government. If patrons did leave for a smoke 
they could not re-enter the licensed premise or any other licensed premise. A similar 
problem was created for patrons who may have wished to leave licensed premises to 
calm down after experiencing some conflict with other patrons: “No opportunity to 
leave in order to cool off, get some fresh air, have a smoke, come back later” (p7, p9). 
“Some patrons become agitated just before 3am as to where they want to go between 
3am-5am. Instead of staying in until 4am patrons leave at 2:45am” (p11). “Hard to see 
any pluses, lack of police after lockout (9p13gg), no change, most people at that time 
you knock back” (p18). Calibre of patron not high – 40% drop in business” (p19).  
 In relation to transport concerns, advantages and disadvantages were noted with some 
participants feeling that waiting times for taxis had improved during the lockout time 
period: “No massive line up now between 3am-5am, but problem now between 12am-
3am, massive transport problem” (p7). “Increases- taxi issue now between 12am-3am 
(p9).” “Prior to 3am terrible, after 3am not too bad depending on where you are, 
reasonable near venue” (p9). 
 However, a number of participants clearly believed that the lockout strategy 
had in fact created two rush hours to access public transport whereas previously there 
had only been one.  Another theme to emerge was the general perception that waiting 
lines were extremely long and public transport (buses, train & taxis) was poorly 
coordinated: “There are two rush hours now instead of one patrons leave before 3am 
to go  home or enter another nightclub before lockout and another rush occurs at 
5am” (p8, p15, p12).  Prior to lockout rush hour was 4:30am-6am” (p12). “Public 
Transport poorly coordinated, not efficient…taxis ranks a mile long” (p1, p2, p15, 
p17). 
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Public Safety and Security 
A problem noted by one participant related to a group of homeless people who hung 
around licensed premises. This group of people were generally not patrons of licensed 
premises, but rather spent time hanging around them looking for opportunities to 
score illicit drugs or approach people for money. This problem appeared to be more 
prevalent in the mall areas of Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley rather than in the 
Gold Coast area: “There are a group of people that hang around the malls in    
Brisbane…. they use illicit drugs and pose a problem…. and they are not associated 
with the pubs and clubs” (p8). 
Other safety concerns that emerged as themes related to a lack of police and 
security presence and police being generally too slow to respond to behavioural 
problems: “Police don’t’ take enough action early enough” (p8, p12). “Need stronger 
police presence (p3, p8)”. During the lockout sometimes females get stuck outside 
without their friends and cannot get in” (p8, p2).  
 Concern was also expressed that environmental factors such as narrow 
footpaths, dark alley ways and long patron lines increased the risk of injury and 
aggressive outbursts among patrons: “footpaths too narrow….long lines into venue 
stretch onto roads….traffic passes too fast and close….pedestrians have been injured 
and killed” (p2). In addition, some participants felt that there were too many 
nightclubs densely located in a small geographical area that were in part responsible 
for creating crowding and violence on the streets: “Entertainment areas too congested 
with clubs and people. Not enough security personal at taxi ranks” (p12, p 3).  
Another theme related to the dispensing of illicit drugs in and around 
nightclubs, particularly clubs owned by bikie groups. In addition, some participants 
believed that the security industry was not adequately regulated in that some of them 
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had employees who were associated with a criminal element: “Bikie groups who own 
licensed premises are a problem…….illicit drugs are dispensed in some venues” (p5, 
p2, p6). “Police beat at Surfers Paradise moved from central highly visible area to less 
visible and centralised area” (9p13gg). “Security Services cannot meet 
demand….govt takes too long to process applications (re security officers 
positions)…..some security services associated with organised crime” (p7). 
 A number of participants suggested a variety of strategies that might improve 
public and patron safety. These included ensuring police beats were highly visible and 
that police presence was more regular and a need for more CCTVs: “More CCTVs, 
more police patrols and improved lighting” (p10, p15, p17). “Police need to do more 
walk bys and cruises” (p8). It was suggested that barriers should be erected along 
footpaths in order to prevent patrons spilling onto roadways and to protect them from 
passing traffic: “Traffic needs to be diverted from central entertainment area. Barriers 
on footpath would provide protection to patrons, prevent spillage onto roads. Speed 
limit should be lowered during late night trading hours” (p. 12, p17, p18). In addition, 
a need was expressed for trained crowd controllers around taxis lines and ranks. 
Furthermore, contravention of liquor licensing laws should be policed by a demerit 
point system and penalties allotted to varying demerit points: “Need a central hub for 
taxis and properly trained crowd controllers on ranks” (p7, p4). Reduce and cap 
number of licensed premises….too many nightclubs in a small area” (p9, p15). 
“Introduce a demerit point system for contravention…..when reach allotted points 
license to be suspended or lost” (p2,).  
Implementation Process Issues 
Responses from the participants indicated that there were differences in the 
implementation processes between the Gold Coast and Brisbane City/Fortitude 
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Valley.  The lockout policy was introduced in the Gold Coast following a lengthy 
consultation process. In addition, the Gold Coast had been serviced by a well 
coordinated Surfer Paradise Action Project since the middle of the 1990s and 
specialised police unit (LEAPS) that worked closely with other government agencies 
and licensees to enforce liquor licensing laws. The lockout policy was initially 
coordinated by the local council in the Gold Coast area and comments by participants 
in this area included: “Lockout and extension of the LEAPS and Surfers Paradise 
Safety Action   Projects………Introduced after long consultation process involving 
local  businesses, licensees and community members. Lockout initially led and 
introduced by Gold Coast Council. Specialised dedicated well trained police unit that 
co-ordinates multi agency group to enforce and regulate liquor laws. Structured and 
systematic process of auditing nightclubs and enforcing laws based on intelligence led 
policing.  Regular meetings between police and licensees…. Not all licensees attend” 
(p6, p14, p16). 
In contrast, the lockout strategy in Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley was 
introduced in the context of media publicity and public concern about violence and 
disorder on the streets around licensed premises trading late. While there was some 
consultation, this appears to have been carried out in a rather hasty manner and some 
licensees and security firms believed they were excluded from the process. While it is 
acknowledged that that there were some alcohol safety action groups (eg., VAMP) in 
place, another theme to emerge was that participants indicated that meetings were 
irregular. In addition, police in the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley did not operate in a 
specialised way compared to the Gold Coast. The policy in regards to how incidents 
requiring attendance by police were dealt with also changed after the introduction of 
the lockout. It should also be noted that the majority, 23 of the 25 late-night trading 
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licensed premises on the Gold Coast are located in a small geographical area of 
Surfers Paradise. However, there are a greater number of licensed premises trading 
late in Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley (approximately 63) and these are spread over a 
much larger geographical area. Some of the participant’s responses included: “Most 
major security firms not contacted” (p7, p8, p9, p11, p18). “Some safety action groups 
such as VAMP already in place. Liaison group meetings between police and licensees 
exist but some complaints about lack of regular meeting and lack of attendance” 
(p11). “Audits by liquor licensing officers seem to occur regularly….at least once per 
month” (p11). “Recording of police incidents changed after the lockout was 
introduced. Prior to lockout it was not mandatory to record and follow up on all 
incidents, particularly if incidents were minor and made by an intoxicated person. 
After the lockout, there was a new incident reporting direction that required 
mandatory recording and follow up of all incidents” (p2, p20). “Police recruited from 
general operational police and not specialised. Some evidence that a few clubs 
contravened lockout by allowing patrons in ……at least one club was prosecuted” 
(p12). 
Discussion 
The present paper aimed to report on both the outcome and process impact of a 
lockout legislative provision on levels of alcohol-related offences in and around late-
night trading licensed premises situated in Brisbane and on the Gold Coast, 
Queensland, Australia.  The lockout policy involved preventing patrons from entering 
licensed premises between the hours of 3am until time of closing at 5am. Patrons 
were permitted to remain in the licensed premises consuming alcohol until the time of 
closing but those who chose to leave for any reason were not permitted to re-enter. 
Overall, the quantitative findings suggest that the lockout policy may have been 
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marginally effective for some kinds of offences in certain areas. The qualitative 
findings revealed benefits of the lockout policy that could not be demonstrated by a 
solely quantitative analysis and highlighted other strategies that could be utilised to 
improve patron safety. 
Impact of Lockout Policy on Alcohol-related Incidents 
The lockout policy seems to have resulted in some significant positive effects in the    
Gold Coast Police District, but the benefits were marginal at best in the 
Brisbane/Fortitude Valley. These differences may well be due to the implementation 
processes discussed below.   
Alcohol-related incidents in the Gold Coast Police District were proportionally 
reduced after the introduction of the lockout policy for all time periods (across 24 
hours). In addition, there were significantly fewer alcohol-related incidents during the 
critical time period of the lockout policy (3am-6am). A closer examination of the 
major category of offences across all time periods revealed that there was a reduction 
in alcohol-related disturbances/dispute by 6.2%, a reduction in alcohol-related street 
disturbances by 12.3% and a reduction in alcohol-related sexual offences by 33.7%. 
While downward trends were observed for the other three major categories of 
offences in the Gold Coast area there were no significant differences.  
A further analysis of the major category of offences in the Gold Coast area in 
the three main time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am & 6am-9am) during late-night 
liquor trading and just after close of trading was also undertaken. This analysis 
revealed that only a few of the offence categories experienced a decline at specific 
time periods. For example, after the introduction of the lockout policy 
disturbances/disputes involving alcohol declined by 19.2% during the 12am-3am time 
period. In addition, alcohol-related street disturbances and sexual offences 
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experienced a decline by approximately 18% and 29% respectively during all the 
other time periods, but not during the three main time periods of late-night liquor 
trading. Finally, alcohol-related traffic offences increased by 4.5% during all the other 
time periods but not during the three main time periods associated with late-night 
liquor trading.  
In regards to the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley Police precincts, no significant 
variations were found for alcohol-related incidents across all the time periods 
following the introduction of the lockout. In addition, there were no significant 
differences for alcohol-related incidents between the 3am-6am time period after the 
introduction of the lockout legislative provision in Brisbane City or Fortitude Valley.  
A closer examination of the major category of offences across all the time periods 
revealed little variation for the majority of alcohol-related offences following the 
introduction of the lockout policy. Alcohol-related trauma in Fortitude Valley was the 
only offence category to experience a significant reduction by 30% after the lockout 
policy was introduced.  
A further more detailed analysis of the data for the Brisbane City/Fortitude 
Valley involving the three main time periods coinciding with liquor late-night trading 
revealed only a few significant variations. Alcohol-related traffic offences, was the 
only offence category in Brisbane City to experience a significant decline by 12.9% 
during the lockout period. There were a number of significant variations in Fortitude 
Valley but there were no reductions experienced during the 3am-6am (lockout period) 
time period after the introduction of the lockout.  Alcohol-related street disturbances 
and personal trauma declined by 16% and 14.6% respectively during all the other 
time periods. While alcohol-related disturbances /disputes experienced a reduction by 
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29% between 12am-3am, these types of offences increased by 33.8% between 3am-
6am after the introduction of the lockout policy. 
The quantitative findings of this study share some similarities with previous 
research (d’ Abbs & Tongi, 2000: Edwards et al., 1994) that indicate reductions in 
licensed trading hours can have a positive impact in reducing levels of alcohol-related 
harms. In addition, this study highlights the complex nature and the difficulties 
associated with implementing a preventive policy to curb violence and disorder 
associated with the alcohol industry. For example, while this study demonstrated that 
the lockout produced some positive benefits such as reducing disturbances, sexual 
offences and traffic incidents in some locations, other major categories of offences 
(e.g., assaults) typically involving alcohol remained unaffected by the lockout policy.  
 The lockout policy, as a crime prevention strategy however, appears to have 
been more successful than the strategy of reducing liquor trading hours. For instance, 
the randomised controlled Australian study by Walker & Biles, (1997) found that 
reducing liquor trading hours had little impact on overall crime rates, but may have 
contributed to a decline in drink driving offences.           
Process Impact of the Lockout Policy 
In respect to the implementation processes related to the introduction of the lockout 
policy, there were some key differences between the Gold Coast Police District and 
Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley that might explain the somewhat contrasting results. 
For instance, the lockout was initially introduced by the local Council in the Gold 
Coast area following lengthy consultation process. The lockout policy was introduced 
by the State government in the Brisbane/Fortitude Valley area a year later following 
its perceived success on the Gold Coast. The consultation process appears to have 
been brief and some key stakeholders felt they were excluded from the consultation 
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process. In addition, the Gold Coast area had the advantage of a specialised police 
unit that worked closely with other government agencies to rigorously enforce liquor 
licensing laws referred to as the LEAPS program. The Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley 
did not have such a unit or program at the time the lockout was first initiated. The 
Surfer Paradise Action Project was established to encourage appropriate behaviour 
and safe alcohol beverage service and was a well coordinated project in the Gold 
Coast area. While some alcohol safety action groups did exist in the Brisbane 
City/Fortitude Valley, these do not appear to have been as well coordinated as in the 
Gold Coast area.  
It should also be noted that most of the late-night liquor trading premises in 
the Gold Coast Area are densely concentrated in two main streets in Surfers Paradise 
whereas in the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley there are a greater number of late-night 
liquor trading premises and they are spread out over a much larger geographical area. 
Another major factor that may have affected the outcome of the lockout policy related 
to a policy change in how police dealt with and recoded alcohol-related incidents in 
the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley following the introduction of the lockout. Prior to 
the lockout it had been police practice not to record or follow up on minor complaints 
made by very intoxicated patrons, as it was almost impossible to verify the 
complaints and institute legal action. Following the lockout policy, all complaints 
were required to be recorded and followed up where practically possible. 
In regards to the main advantages of the lockout policy, most licensees 
believed that patron numbers and income were largely unaffected by the lockout. 
Licensees were generally initially opposed to the introduction of the lockout due to 
fears about the possible negative impact on business. To counter the possible negative 
effect, licensees’ implemented strategies to encourage patrons to remain in their 
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licensed premise during the lockout time period.  Additionally, most licensees denied 
that violence was a problem within their licensed premise. They indicated that most 
violence occurred on the street and some believed that the level of violence on the 
streets had been curbed by the lockout while others felt the lockout had no impact. 
However, police officers generally reported that it was much quieter on the streets 
during the lockout policy time period.  
A main disadvantage appears to be related to the possibility that the lockout 
policy created two rush hours that impacted on overcrowding at entry points to 
licensed premises and long waiting lines for taxis. A related issue is the risk of 
patrons being hit by motor vehicles as entry waiting lines to licensed premises extend 
on to the roadway or very close to the roadway. In addition, there was some concern 
expressed that licensed premises without designated smoking areas were 
disadvantaged as when patrons left the premise for a smoke they could not return. It 
was also felt that the lockout discouraged aggressive patrons from leaving in order to 
calm down as they could not re-enter. Visitors from interstate and overseas were also 
disadvantaged as they came from areas with no lockout policy and were unaware of 
the lockout and consequently refused entry. 
Theoretical and Policy Implications 
The findings of this research program provide support for the value of place based 
theories of crime, particularly the crime pattern theory, which suggests targeted 
situational crime prevention strategies should be centred on time and place in order to 
reduce incidents of disorder and violence often associated with late night liquor 
trading venues. Intelligence led policing initiatives (and corresponding research) has 
highlighted the need to direct situational crime prevention strategies to specific places 
and times associated with the late night entertainment industry (Block & Block, 1995; 
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Jochelson, 1997; Liquor Enforcement and Proactive Strategies (LEAPS); Palk, Davey 
& Freeman, 2007a, 2007b; Palk & Davey, 2005; Roche & Inglis, 1999; Teece & 
Williams, 2000).  
The quantitative and qualitative findings of the current research project suggest that 
regulatory control policies maybe enhanced through maintaining a high level of consultation 
with the community and key stakeholders to ensure ongoing support for the regulation. 
Additionally, policy makers should work closely with key alcohol industry partners to 
encourage cooperation, support and enforcement consistency across late night alcohol 
entertainment venues. The outcomes of this research also suggest that the lockout policy is 
only one regulatory control mechanism that should be combined with other safety measures 
such as reducing vehicular speed, constructing footpath barriers, improving public transport 
and enforcing responsible service of alcohol. A combination of multimodal environmental 
regulatory controls may serve to enhance the effectiveness of the lockout policy and may be 
a cost effective way to reduce the community burden of alcohol-related violence.    
Limitations  
Some methodological limitations associated with the program of research should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the findings.  The data collected only included 
information provided by first response operational (i.e., general duties) police related 
to attendance at actual incidents. Other sections of the police service such as 
detectives, specialist groups, Random Breath Test Units and general duties police who 
were on rostered correspondence days were not included in the study.  The study 
required officers to make a subjective decision as to whether alcohol was involved in 
a recorded incident. As a result, it is anticipated that some level of error (i.e., under or 
over reporting of alcohol) in the labelling of incident types may be evident despite the 
efforts to train officers with the data collection process.  Due to the time differences 
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associated with implementing the lockout in the Gold Coast Police District and 
Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley Police precincts caution has to be excised in 
comparing these two data sets.   Additionally, the authors were restricted by police 
policy and funding and thus were only able to examine data for briefs periods before 
and after the introduction of the lockout policy  
Despite such limitations, the current study is the first major study to 
comprehensively analyse the impact of a lockout policy on levels of alcohol-related 
offences at both a quantitative and qualitative level.  This research has gone beyond 
the traditional approach of focusing on brief categorical data sources to provide a 
better understanding of the process issues from the perspectives of key stakeholders 
involved. These issues have been argued to have a critical impact on the effectiveness 
of the lockout policy.  In particular, the findings highlight the importance of 
implementation processes to successful outcomes and the manner in which local 
factors can either impede or facilitate the success of a crime prevention strategy. One 
implication of this is that police need to be adequately trained and resourced in order 
to respond effectively to the high frequency of incidents that involve alcohol.   
Conclusions 
In summary, the lockout policy seems to have had a positive impact for some types of 
alcohol-related offences mostly in the Gold Coast area. However, alcohol-related 
traffic offences did decline significantly in the Brisbane City following the 
introduction of the lockout policy. On a qualitative level, while the majority of 
licensees were initially opposed to the lockout policy some of the key benefits 
reported included: increased patron numbers; improved public safety; and limited 
impact on revenue. The lockout policy also provided a means by which to keep 
unruly and intoxicated patrons from entering licensed premises. These changes 
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cannot be attributed to any decline that may have occurred due to corresponding 
trends in offence rates as offences remained relatively stable during the study period. 
In addition, there was no evidence that alcohol-related offences were displaced to 
other time periods due to the introduction of the lockout policy.   
This program of research also highlighted the importance of key stakeholders 
and community members working collaboratively to implement strategies to reduce 
levels of violence and disorder associated with the late-night liquor trading industry. 
Previous studies have identified this approach as being important to encouraging safe 
levels of alcohol consumption and improving patron safety (see Doherty  & Roche, 
2003; Homel, et al., 1997; Maguire, Nettleton, Rix, & Raybould, 2003; Mesko, & 
Lobnikar, 2004; Wallin, Norstrom, & Andreasson, 2003).  In addition, the importance 
of a thorough consultation process and a highly trained and dedicated police liquor 
licensing unit appears to result in a more positive impact.  
The study also identified that a number of other strategies need to be carefully 
considered for maximum effectiveness of harm reduction. These include, reducing 
speed limits and erecting footpath barriers during late-night liquor trading hours. The 
issue of permitting a large number of nightclubs densely located to trade late requires 
further examination.  Finally, the lockout policy is only one alcohol-related regulatory 
control crime prevention initiative that attempted to improve patron safety and thus it 
should be implemented as part of a multiplicity of strategies to regulate the late-night 
liquor trading industry.  Future research should re-examine the lockout policy from a 
controlled long term perspective after taking into consideration the qualitative 
findings of this study.  There is also a need to gather information from the patrons of 
late night entertainment venues to gain their views of the impact of the lockout 
policy.  
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Table 1: Number of Incidents in and around Licensed Premises before and after Lockout Legislative 
Provision  
Time Periods Incident Type  
 Alcohol Related 
 
Gold Coast      Brisbane        Valley 
   2004                 2005             2005 
    
Non Alcohol related 
 
Gold Coast     Brisbane          Valley 
   2004               2005                2005 
24 Hours 
Before-no lockout 
After- lockout 
   n     %             n     %             n     %     
  983 (26.0)         864 (34.4)       574 (36.4) 
2031 (23.0)*       927 (35.0)       687 (38.4) 
 
  n         %             n        %          n          %    
2,819 (74.0)      1,645 (65.6)     1,005 (63.6) 
6,966 (77.0)      1,720 (65.0)     1,102 (61.6) 
 
(3am-6am) 
Before- no lockout 
After – lockout 
 
  149 (51.3)          211(59.4)         72(51.8) 
  215 (39.0)*        256(60.2)       103(56.3) 
 
 
  141 (49.7)          144 (40.6)          67 (48.2) 
  337 (61.0)          169 (39.8 )         80 (43.7) 
 
*Significant at the Alpha level 0.05. (Figures in brackets are percentages) 
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Table 2: Alcohol and non alcohol-related offences in and around Licensed Premises before and after Lockout 
Policy and across 24 hours 
Offence Incident Type  
 Alcohol Related 
Gold Coast     Brisbane          Valley 
                                                                       
  n      %             n     %            n     %            
Non Alcohol related 
Gold Coast       Brisbane            Valley 
 
n        %                n      %             n      % 
Disturbance/Dispute1 
Before 
After 
 
135(40.6)          98(60.5)         82(53.9) 
240(34.4)        122(67.4)         97(62.2)  
 
 
197(59.4)             64(39.5)           70(46.1) 
458(65.6)             59(32.6)           59(37.8)  
 
Street/Disturbance2 
Before 
After 
 
108(73.0)         94(55.0)          63(65.6) 
105(60.7)*       95(56.2)          84(56.0)    
 
 
  40(27)                77(45.0)           33(34.4) 
  68(39.3)             74(43.8)           66(44.0) 
 
Sexual Offences3 
Before 
After 
 
  13(56.5)           9(31.0)             5(50.0) 
  13(22.8)*       10(25.6)          11(50.0)  
 
 
  10(43.5)             20(69.0)            5(50.0) 
  44(77.2)             29(74.4)          11(50.0)  
Traffic offences4 
Before 
After  
 
 
261(37.0)      321(61.1)        109(54.8) 
702(38.9)      363(60.8)        150(52.3)   
 
 
 445(59.7)          204(38.9)            90(45.2) 
1104(64.7)         234(39.2)          137(47.7)  
 
Assaults5 
Before 
After 
 
 
  45(48.4)         29(39.7)         25(52.1) 
  67(41.6)         40 (52.6)        45(71.4) 
 
 
  48(51.6)             44(66.3)            23(47.9) 
  94(58.4)             36(47.4)            18 (28.6)  
 
Personal Trauma6 
Before 
After  
 
 
  18(19.6)         17(18.3)         31(42.5) 
  48(20.4)         10(11.0)           7(12.5)* 
 
 
  69(85.2)            76 (81.7)            42(57.5) 
247(96.1)            81(89.0)             49(87.5)  
 
*Significant at the Alpha level 0.05  (Figures in bracket are percentages) 1A disturbance/dispute is defined as a breach of peace that occurs inside a licensed 
premise 2A street/disturbance (e.g., fighting, a nuisance, shouting) is an incident that occurs outside a licensed premise 3Includes rape, attempted rape, 
indecent assault, wilful exposure and indecent acts 4Includes all vehicle/traffic related incidents resulting in offences, as well as traffic incidents involving  
accidents and unlawful entry of motor vehicles. 5Includes common assaults and serious assaults against persons.6Includes injuries and deaths caused by 
industrial/domestic accidents, suicide related incidents and incidents involving the mentally ill. 
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Table 3:  Alcohol-related offences for the key three hour time periods and all other 
times on the Gold Coast before and after the lockout 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Offences             12am-3am       3am-6am                   6am-9am                All Other Times 
                           n    %         n      %                        n   %                      n    %  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dispute  
Disturbance 
Before  39(76.5)                13(54.2)  5(20.8)        78(33.5) 
After  71(57.3)*        15(46.9)       7(22.6)      147(28.8) 
 
Street 
Disturbance 
Before  46(82.1)               26(83.9)  2(100.0)         36(61.0) 
After  59(60.1)               12(66.7)  1(100.7)         34(43.1)* 
 
Sexual  
Before    6(75.0)                2(66.7)    0(0.0)               5(45.5) 
After    2(40.0)         3(100.0)                1(16.7)               7(16.3)* 
 
Traffic   
Before               53(60.2)               25(64.1)                  20(29.0)            63(32.0) 
After             123(57.5)              55(57.9)                   40(23.3)        484(36.5)* 
 
Assaults 
Before                 15(75.0)            13(86.7)               0(0.0)                 17(32.0) 
After                   27(73.0)             3(75.0)               5(41.7)                  32(29.6) 
 
Personal 
Trauma 
Before                 2(25.0)                    2(28.6)              1(20.0)                   13(18.1) 
After              5(19.2)                 4(33.3)              8(32.0)                 31(18.0) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
*Significant at alpha 0.05 level. Figures in brackets are percentages 
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Table 4:  Alcohol-related offences for the key three hour time periods and all other time   
periods in Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley before and after the lockout 
Offence Type Brisbane City 
 
Fortitude Valley 
 
 
 12 am-3am    3am-6am     6am-9am     All Other 
                                                             Times
12am-3am   3am-6am    6am-9am   All Other 
Times
Dispute/Disturbance  
Before 
After 
 
 42(82.4)         11(73.3)       1(20.1)        44(48.4) 
 57(73.1)         20(83.3)       4(66.7)        41(56.2) 
 
 
25(65.8)         8(42.1)      45(50.0)    45(51.7) 
  7(36.8)*     22(75.9)*      2(50.0)    66(63.5)  
 
Street Disturbance 
Before 
After 
 
 43(71.7)        18(69.2)        5(35.7)        28(39.4) 
 26(63.4)        40(63.5)        2(28.6)        27(46.6) 
 
 
17(68.0)      12(75.0)        2(40.0)    33(66.0) 
25(65.8)      17(63.0)        1(20.0)    40(50.0)* 
 
Sexual Offences 
Before 
After 
 
   5 (71.4)         6(85.7)         6(100.0%)    1(10.0)
   2(33.3)          3(50.0)         4(100.0%)    2(9.1)  
 
 
  2(100.0)      0(0.0)          3(100.0)     3(50.0)   
  3(75.0)        2(40.0)        3(100.0      3(30.0) 
Traffic offences 
Before 
After  
 
 
130(85.0)      60(88.2)       11(28.9%)    120 (45.1)
140(80.5)      67(75.3)*     17(45.9%)    139(46.8)
 
 
33(76.7)     19(79.2)        3(25.0)       54(45.0) 
49(79.0)     17(70.8)        4(16.7)       80(45.2) 
 
Assaults 
Before 
After 
 
 
  12(57.1)        8(66.7)         0(0.0%)            9(24.3
  15(68.2)      12(63.2)         1(50.0)          1 2(36.4)
 
 
   6(66.7)      5(50.0)        1(25.0)       13(52.0) 
 15(93.8)    11(84.6)        1(100.0)     18(54.5) 
 
Personal Trauma 
Before 
After  
 
 
    2(18.2)        3(37.5)         1(11.1%)       11(16.9)
    2(18.2)        0(0.0)           1(7.1%)           7(11.3)
   
 
   7(50.0)      4(80.0)         5(50.0)      15(34.1) 
   0(0.0)        0(0.0)           1(14.3)        6(14.6)* 
 
*Significant at the alpha 0.05 level (figures in brackets are percentages) 
 
 
